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Far from dominating EU decision-making, France and
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A common assumption is that the largest EU countries get their way most often in
negotiations within the EU’s institutions. Contrary to this perspective, Jonathan Golub finds
that smaller states like Finland tend to be far more successful at negotiating EU legislation
than countries like France and Germany. He also finds little evidence for the idea that
Member States might ‘buy influence’ by trading legislative outcomes for contributions to the
EU budget. Indeed, the same countries which are successful at negotiating legislation are
also likely to pay less than their fair share into the budget.
Criticism of  the European Union comes in many f lavours. Some Eurosceptics f ear that Germany
dominates, shaping integration to suit its own interests. Others worry that the EU tilts too much in
f avour of  France. Or perhaps the “Franco-German axis” jointly calls the shots. Recriminations over which
states get what pervade EMU negotiations as well as EU budget talks: those yearly f estivals of  national
outrage where leaders insist – some more diplomatically than others – that their country contributes too
much and receives litt le of  value in return. But to get a f ull picture of  how the EU works, and of  which
national views tend to prevail, attention must f ocus on the EU’s main activity: adopting legislation.
Hundreds of  policies every year, governing everything f rom products and services to f ood and the
environment, agriculture, f ishing, banking, working conditions; the scope of  EU law is enormous and
growing.
Like previous studies of  legislative bargaining success, I analysed data f rom the European Union Decides
project, an international collaboration that tracked 162 policy issues negotiated between 1995 and 2002.
Most of  the laws were adopted between 1999 and 2001. For each proposal, the project identif ied and
placed on a scale f rom zero to one hundred every country’s ideal policy posit ion, the importance
(“salience”) they attached to the proposal, and the posit ion of  the agreed outcome. In cases where
national posit ions were not recorded, some authors have decided to impute these missing values, others
to omit them, so I considered both approaches.
How do we determine which states achieve the most when hammering out the details of  EU legislation?
Because salience levels vary sharply, the most successf ul states are not simply the ones whose
pref erred posit ions match the adopted laws. Even a small concession on a highly salient policy can have
serious negative domestic consequences. Conversely, carrying the day on a policy with trivial domestic
consequences isn’t much to brag about. I theref ore examined each country’s salience-weighted
bargaining success: the distance of  its ideal posit ion f rom the outcome, multiplied by the salience,
aggregated across the 162 issues.
The results will prove reassuring to some, alarming to others. Figure 1 compares each country’s average
bargaining success to the average success of  all f if teen Member States. The lef t panel excludes missing
values, the right includes imputed data. Either way, there is absolutely no sign of  French or German
dominance. In f act, their bargaining success is f ar below average. My statistical analysis shows that many
of  the smaller states including Finland, Sweden, Luxembourg, Denmark, Ireland and Austria tended to
enjoy signif icantly more bargaining success than either France or Germany or Italy. Even in the f ields
where one might have expected them to excel — France in agricultural policy, Germany in internal market
policies — neither beat the smaller states. Of  the large states, only the UK’s bargaining success matched
these much smaller overachievers.
Figure 1: Average Salience Weighted Bargaining Success (1999-2001)
Why small states achieve such relative success is not entirely clear. It helps that they concentrate their
ef f orts on a limited number of  proposals and avoid taking extreme posit ions that leave them
marginalised. But even af ter we control f or these f actors, French and German perf ormance lags
considerably.
Perhaps legislative winners pay f or their bargaining success with budgetary contributions? Previous
studies have calculated what a f air distribution of  net national contributions would look like, based on
the principle that net contributions should be proportional to national GDP per capita. Any amount a state
receives f rom the EU budget beyond their f air share I treated as a “bonus”. I expected that EU budgetary
data f or the 1995-2002 period would show an inverse relationship between national bonuses and
legislative bargaining success, and also that knowing which states contributed the most money would
improve our ability to predict policy outcomes. Legislative winners can af f ord to be f inancially generous,
since “the policies we want” is a powerf ul answer to the question “what do we get f or all that money we
contribute to the EU budget?” For states with below average bargaining success, sizeable f inancial
transf ers can serve as a welcome compensation. States that care more about the money than about the
policies might even be willing to sell their votes in the Council of  Ministers.
Figure 2 illustrates that, remarkably, most bargaining winners are not budgetary losers: they win on both
counts. Only Sweden has a high level of  legislative bargaining success while contributing relatively more
than any other state to the EU budget. Finland didn’t even pay its f air share. Ireland, Luxembourg and
Denmark received enormously f avourable treatment f rom the EU budget. Germany and France, two of
the states with the worst relative bargaining success, are also two of  the biggest budgetary losers.
Germany paid 4 billion euros per year more than its f air share. France paid 664 million euros per year
more than its f air share. They might wonder what they got f or their money. Judging f rom the posit ion of
legislative outcomes, it certainly wasn’t policy inf luence.
Figure 2: EU Budget Winners and Losers (1995-2002)
Staunch Europhiles might call these types of  national comparisons misguided or beside the point. There
are, af ter all, many reasons f or countries to support European integration regardless of  their relative
bargaining success or relative budgetary contribution. That is certainly true, and they may prove
suf f icient to sustain the EU. But f or many cit izens, the transf er of  polit ical sovereignty to the EU is an
easier pill to swallow if  it  produces either legislation that matches their own state’s national pref erences,
or a substantial f inancial bonus. It is hard to be sanguine about Europe’s f uture if  some states f oot the
bill f or the system and dont get the laws they want, while others come out ahead on both policy and
money.
We do not yet know whether the patterns I identif ied f or the 1995-2002 period are any dif f erent today.
Data f or the post-2004 era have only just recently become available, so that researchers can now
investigate whether in the enlarged EU we see the same constellation of  relative national winners and
losers.
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